This paper examines the discovery process of a recent and extremely successful non-traditional export activity, namely, the Ethiopian flower industry. This industry emerged as a result of entrepreneurial experimentation, whereby private entrepreneurs formed an 'advocacy coalition' to address uncertainties and coordination problems during the start-up phases. As a result of their lobbying, the Ethiopian government launched a strategic coordination with the industry, identifying key areas for intervention and setting a five-year target for the sector's development. This study highlights the importance of a shared vision and good relations between the government and private sector for development of this new industry.
Introduction
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is the region of the developing world with the highest dependence on exports of traditional primary products (UNCTAD, 2008) . Although diversification into non-traditional high-value exports is advocated as an alternative strategy for promoting exports, the performance of SSA in this field has generally been unsatisfactory. UNECA and AU (2007) point out that since the early 1980s Africa's diversification record has been volatile, and gains have been fragile and short-lived. However, in recent years, a few SSA countries (e.g., Kenya, South Africa, Uganda, Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, and Zambia) have made some progress in diversifying into non-traditional horticultural products for export (UNCTAD, 2008) .
The Ethiopian flower industry represents an extraordinarily fast and successful diversification into a non-traditional export product. The floriculture industry began to emerge in the late 1990s and, by 2007, despite its late entry into the flower export industry, Ethiopia had become the fifth largest non-EU exporter to the EU cut-flower market and, after Kenya, the second largest flower exporter from Africa (see Table 2 ). Catherine Riungu describes this spectacular performance in her article "Ethiopia's flower sector outgrows Kenya" (Riungu, 2007) :
"Ethiopia is now Africa's second largest flower exporter after Kenya, with its export earnings growing by 500% over the past year. This has left Kenya stunned, given that five years ago, the Horn of Africa country was doing less than $20 million of exports compared with the East African giant's $300 million. It is estimated that, this year, Ethiopia will close its books at $120 million, slightly less than half of Kenya's earnings. 'It has taken Ethiopia five years to achieve half of what we have in three decades,' Kenya Flower Council chairman Erastus Mureithi said. Going by this rate, Kenya could be overtaken by Ethiopia in a decade, he added."
The export promotion strategy adopted by the Ethiopian government in 1998 provided an extended list of sectors and activities to be prioritized for support, but made no mention of the flower industry. The government was seemingly unaware of the major opportunities offered by this industry and provided no specific support until the end of 2002. The industry emerged as a result of private, entrepreneurial experimentation.
So what triggered the emergence of the sector, and how did it evolve? What have been the relative roles of the state and the private sector in the process of discovery of the flower industry? What lessons can be learnt from this astonishing success for the promotion of non-traditional exports? The objective of this study is to examine these and other related issues as part of the "discovery" process of the Ethiopian flower industry. Examining this process should enrich our understanding of development strategies for promoting non-traditional activities in developing countries.
This study exploits two main data sources: a survey conducted in early 2008 and follow-up interviews with industry leaders and policy makers. The survey was a census covering all operational flower farms.
1 Descriptions of the survey and a summary of the characteristics of the firms in our data can be found in Section 4.
2 Additional discussions were held with various actors in the sector including government officials (e.g., coordinators of the flower sector at the Ministry of Trade and Industry and the director of the recently established Horticulture Development Agency), association leaders, and owners of the early entrants (e.g., Ethio-Flora and Golden Rose).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the analytical framework, a functional approach, to explain the successful emergence of non-traditional exports in developing countries. Section 3 gives an overview of the international cut-flower industry. Section 4 provides a policy background and a survey of the flower industry. Section 5 maps the evolution of the Ethiopian flower industry using the framework developed in Section 2. The last section summarizes the main findings.
How do new export activities emerge successfully in developing countries?
An analytical framework
Interest in industrial policy and in particular on the right balance between the role of the market and the role of the state has increased in recent years. Rodrik (2004 Rodrik ( , 2007 , Rodrik (2003, 2006) , Hausman and Klinger (2006) , and Hausman, Hwang, and Rodrik (2005) , among others, all provide insights on industrial policy and the promotion of new export activities in developing countries within an increasingly international context. Despite the widely held view (commonly referred to as the "resource curse") that diversification into primary commodities and natural resources can be detrimental to countries' growth prospects, this literature defines industrial policy as stimulating specific economic activities and promoting structural change in both industry and nontraditional agriculture and service sectors (Rodrik, 2007) . This emerging literature perceives successful promotion of new export activity as a process of "self-discovery" and "ongoing learning." Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) define "self-discovery" as the process of establishing the cost structure of an economy for the production of goods that are already available in the world market. They argue that the factor endowment model which predicts a broad structure of comparative advantage (e.g., labor intensive, natural-resource based products, etc.) is too broad a classification to be helpful, as hundreds or even thousands of products may be included in its categories. To be successful, policies need to focus on specific activities. This has at least two important implications for the promotion of new activities, both of which justify government interventions.
First, producing a new product involves highly specific and customized inputs, which may be both private and public. Firms that venture into new products will face difficulties in securing the requisite inputs (Hausmann and Klinger, 2006) . For some, there may not be markets, which can create serious coordination problems (Hausmann and Rodrik, 2006) . Second, the profitability and success of a new activity cannot be known with certainty ex-ante. There is a large element of uncertainty in terms of what a country will be good at producing and much randomness in the process of discovering this. The discovery process requires entrepreneurial experimentation. However, entrepreneurial experimentation in new activities is costly and rife with market failures (e.g., information externalities and coordination failures). Private businesses are less willing to take risks; hence, coordination and provision of rents by governments are required to stimulate the discovery process (Hausmann and Rodrik, 2006) . This process of identification of more competitive activities should lead to structural transformations; however, the roadmap is unclear.
Despite providing some very useful insights, this literature offers little guidance about how to identify the key policy problems and does not propose an explicit framework for understanding the process of emergence of new activities. This is partly due to its reliance on the concept of "market failure" to justify government interventions. Cimoli, Dosi, Nelson, and Stiglitz (2010) argue that "… the 'market failure' language tends to be quite misleading in that, in order to evaluate the necessity and efficacy of any policy, it takes as a yardstick those conditions under which standard normative ("welfare") theorem hold. … In a profound sense, when judged with standard canons, the whole world can be seen as a huge market failure!" Metcalfe (1994) also argues that although market failures provide a general rationale for policy intervention, they do not provide specific guidance to policymakers. In fact, they create problems for policymakers because each case of market failure requires new policy. Market failures also increase the real cost of policymaking given their ubiquitous nature.
To be able to break into non-traditional exports, developing countries do not necessarily have to invent new products, but rather tap into the global pool of knowledge and produce goods, at a lower cost, that are already established on the world market. Hausmann and Klinger (2006) argue the differential ability of developing countries to imitate foreign technology depends on the distance of a country's specialization to the rest of the product space. New activities that develop need to exploit existing capabilities that were developed and accumulated for other preexisting activities. Cimoli, Dosi, and Stiglitz (2010:4) , on the other hand, argue that accumulation of knowledge and capabilities should not be limited to education and formally acquired skills, but also to problem solving capabilities embodied in organizations-concerning, for example, production technologies, marketing, labor relations, as well as the "dynamic capabilities" of search and learning. Such a process involves a fundamental organizational dimension. Indeed, organizational building is one of the most difficult tasks facing developmental industrial policies.
This requires tapping into a global pool of knowledge, diffusion of imported knowledge, and concomitantly a self-evaluation on the following points: (i) the technological capabilities of individual and corporate organizations and the rate at which they actually learn; (ii) the economic signals that they face; and (iii) the ways they interact with each other and with non-market institutions (Cimoli, Dosi, Nelson, and Stiglitz, 2010:26) . These points suggest the importance of "systemic" understanding on knowledge acquisition and the diffusion process.
Similarly, understanding the factors behind the successful emergence of new activities requires a systemic approach, the "innovation systems". The Innovation system (IS, hereafter) is defined by Freeman (1987:1) as "the network of institutions in the public and private sectors whose activities and interactions initiate, import, modify and diffuse new technologies." The focus of the IS approach is on the diffusion of new technology. It enables the identification of the relevant actors (firms and other organizations, networks, and institutions) that may block or induce the evolution of new productive activities. Identifying the IS structure and components is not enough, however. How these actors function through interacting is equally important. In fact, the focus should be on "what is actually happening" as a result of interaction (i.e., the functions) in the IS, rather than the existence of institutions and stakeholders (Jacobsson, 2005) . Just as structural transformation requires changes within the wider web of stakeholdersboth vertical and horizontal-to transform activities from low-value added to higher value, the systemic approach may provide an appropriate framework to understand the transition process. Hekkert et al. (2007) and Bergek et al. (2008) proposed a functionality of innovation systems analysis and identified seven functions crucial for the systembuilding process for emerging technology: (i) knowledge development and diffusion; (ii) entrepreneurial experimentation; (iii) influence of the direction of search; (iv) market formation; (v) legitimation; (vi) resource mobilization; and (vii) development of positive externalities. According to them, for an IS to evolve and perform well, these seven functional requirements must be fulfilled. This methodology was introduced for emerging technologies, mainly environmental, in developed countries. The emerging technology shares some commonality with emerging activities in developing countries, as stakeholders face similar degrees of uncertainty and require certain activities/technologies to diffuse. Hence, the functions identified within the framework, with some modification, can be applied to understanding the emergence of new activities in developing countries. Jacobsson and Bergek (2006) applied the functional framework for emerging industries in developing countries. To analyze systematically the emergence of the Ethiopian flower industry, we conceptualized the functional approach to innovation systems in the developing country context. Detailed discussions can be found in the working paper version of this article. 3 The main questions we address in each function are summarized in Table 1 . Table 2 gives the summary of the international cut-flower trade and top importer and exporter countries in 2007. That year the international cut-flower trade represented about US$7 billion, with Europe by far the largest cut-flower market. The European Union (EU-27) alone accounted for about 66 percent of world flower imports and 60 percent of world exports in 2007. The largest part of this consists of intra-EU import/export. In descending order, the United Kingdom (UK), Germany, the United States of America (USA), the Netherlands, and France are the five largest importer countries of cut flowers. The Netherlands is not only one of the largest importers but also the largest exporter, accounting for about 55 percent of world cut-flower exports. It is uniquely positioned in the international flower industry, as a producer accounting for half of the total EU production value (Center for the Promotion of Imports from Developing Countries, 2007) and as a re-export hub for many developing nations to other countries in Europe and elsewhere. The leading world exporters of cut flowers after the Netherlands are Colombia, Ecuador, and Kenya in that order. The largest market for Latin American exporter countries is the USA, though some also have a large presence in the EU market. In contrast, most of the cut-flower exports (about 90 percent) from Africa are destined for the EU market. The role of African countries as suppliers of cut flowers, particularly to the EU market, has grown with the entry of new flower exporter countries including Zimbabwe, Zambia, Uganda, Tanzania, and Ethiopia. In 2007, out of the top 12 extra-EU supplier countries to the EU market, seven were from Africa (see Table  2 ).
Overview of the international cut-flower market
Since 1993, EU imports of fresh cut flowers have been dominated by roses. In 2006, the Netherlands was by far the leading supplier of roses to the EU (59 percent), followed by Kenya (23 percent) and Ecuador (6 percent) (CBI, 2007) . Roses can be divided into three segments based on stem length and bud size: sweethearts, intermediates, and T-hybrids. Prices vary significantly according to the type of rose. The larger-budded roses command higher prices, sometimes reaching more than double that of small-budded roses. By contrast, the yield per meter-square is higher for smaller roses than larger-budded roses. A hot and humid climate is ideal for the small budded variety, while a cooler climate is better suited for the large budded variety. This demonstrates the complexity in understanding the geographical and climatic advantages of one's own country before selecting the type of variety to produce, even within the same product type of "rose." Accordingly, the type of rose which is produced and exported by each exporting country varies considerably. For example, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe are specialized in small-budded varieties (sweethearts and smaller intermediates). Kenya grows a mix of small-and medium-sized budded varieties. Ecuador on the other hand is specialized in big-budded varieties (so-called Thybrids) (CBI, 2007) . Similar to Ecuador, Ethiopia exports mainly large-budded flowers that include intermediate and T-hybrid types (see Table 3 ).
Policy background and description of the Ethiopian flower industry survey
Following the change of government in 1991, Ethiopia adopted a structural adjustment program and began to implement extensive reforms to transform the previous command economy to a market-oriented one. In the mid-1990s the Ethiopian government announced its development vision: the Agricultural Development Led Industrialization (ADLI). 4 In 1998, it adopted an Export Promotion Strategy, listing priority sectors, such as manufacturing and agro industries, which would receive preferential treatment. The flower industry was not included in the list of priority sectors.
A comprehensive Industrial Development Strategy (IDS) was formulated in 2002/03. A key element of the IDS is the link between industry and agriculture, which is based on the broader ADLI. Another core element of the IDS is that sustainable and rapid industrial development can only be ensured if the sector is competitive in the international market. Hence, export-oriented sectors should lead industrial development and be given preferential treatment. Third, the IDS recognizes the role of the private sector as a driver of the industrialization process. Fourth, the strategy states the importance of government intervention not only as a facilitator but also as a leader (i.e., in providing direct support, coordinating, and guiding the private sector). It cites two important mechanisms by which the government can engage and promote the private sector: creating a conducive environment and providing direct support for selected sectors. The strategy also lists priority sectors for direct government support (MoFED, 2006) .
Ethiopia is one of the poorest countries in the world, with a per capita income of less than US$200 (at 2000 constant price); nevertheless, its economy has been on a continuous high growth trajectory. For example, between 2004 and 2008, GDP grew by an annual average of 11.8 percent (WB-WDI, 2010) . During this period, there has been significant growth in export earnings, averaging 24 percent (National Bank of Ethiopia, 2007/08). Nevertheless, Ethiopia's pattern of exports in the last five years demonstrates that the growth is based mainly on agricultural products, from diversification to non-traditional exports and intensification of traditional goods.
5 According to the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE) 2007/08 annual report, cut flowers, pulses, live animals, and oil seeds are among the high performers, with 444 percent, 101 percent, 73 percent, and 25 percent annual growth respectively. The cut flower industry is a particularly successful diversification for Ethiopia.
Ethiopia is endowed with the conditions required for a successful flower industry (i.e., flat land at high altitudes, a cool climate, low-cost labor, proximity to major markets, and an international airport near to the production areas). Ethiopia (like Ecuador) is regarded as especially suited to the production of high quality, T-hybrid roses (Reinders, 2008) . In the early 1980s, there was a brief 4 ADLI is a development strategy based on a philosophy whereby agricultural development plays a leading role in the industrialization process by providing the conditions for fully fledged industrialization through the supply of inputs to the industry sector, generating foreign exchange for importing industrial inputs and creating markets for industry outputs. 5 Ethiopia's export structure has barely changed since the 1990s and is based mainly on agricultural products (e.g., food accounted for some 61 percent of total exports in 2007). effort made by state farms to produce and export summer flowers to Europe. There was some expertise related to flower growing, but it had not been well utilized until quite recently.
In the mid-1990s, two domestic private entrepreneurs started to experiment by investing in flower production (mainly summer flowers) with export target. A modern and large-scale floriculture industry, however, began to emerge in the early 2000s after a foreign-owned company, known as Golden Rose, heralded the production of roses in steel greenhouses. Until 2003, only five farms were engaged in the production and exporting of flowers. The number of firms increased substantially over the next few years and reached about 81 by 2008.
A first comprehensive survey of the emerging Ethiopian flower industry was conducted in early 2008. Data was collected from 64 flower farms out of the 67 operating at that time-with a response rate of 96 percent. The questionnaire instruments cover among other things: the history of cut-flower enterprises, characteristics of entrepreneurs, export varieties and destination, source of inputs, production capacity, logistics, employment and wages, sales and costs, investment and loans, learning and competition, and business climate. Table 3 summarizes some characteristics of the firms in our data set. The employment size of the firms ranges between 100 and 1670 workers, and more than half (58 percent) of the firms employ between 100 and 300 workers. About half of the farms have five to 10 hectares of flower-covered land, while 25 The majority of the farms (64 percent) are located within a 50-kilometer radius of the capital city, Addis Ababa, where the main airport is. Almost the same percent of farms are located at altitudes over 2000 meters above sea level. Such a high altitude enables production of high-quality roses (long-stem and large buds) such as intermediates and T-hybrid, which command higher prices in the world market. As a result, most (80 percent) of the flower farms were mainly producing and exporting roses. Rose exports account for about 85 percent of total export revenue. The intermediates and T-hybrid types of roses, on the other hand, account for over 90 percent of total rose exports. This suggests that the successful entry of Ethiopia in the flower-export industry may partly be explained by the ability to seize opportunities in the niche market for large-budded roses.
Mapping the functional patterns of the Ethiopian flower industry
In this section, we employ the seven key functions to highlight the flower industry discovery process and the factors that have contributed to the success of the flower export sector in Ethiopia. Based on the earlier description of flower industry, each function is explained in terms of this specific context.
Entrepreneurial experimentation: iterative learning process

First movers
Meskel Flowers Plc. was the first private company to engage in export-oriented commercial flower farming in Ethiopia. The farm in Meki, 160 kilometers south of the capital, Addis Ababa, began operations in 1993. A second private farm, Ethio-Flora, was established (in Zeway, 98 kilometers south of Addis Ababa) soon after. Both farms are Ethiopian owned and produce summer flowers (field produced) such as alliums, statice, and carnations for export to EU markets. Initially, the farms recruited domestic expertise-mainly former state-owned flower farm employees-but Meskel Flower recruited a production manager from Kenya. Both farms received support from the EU to employ consultants for a period from Kenya and the UK.
Learning took place gradually, and the first entrant (Meskel Flower) made a move in 1999 to begin rose production. It started production using wooden greenhouses, despite steel-based greenhouse technology being mature and available on the international market. In 1996, the EU financed a half-hectare summer flower (carnation) demonstration with Ethio-Flora in Zeway. In the same year, neither of the farms was receiving specific support from the Ethiopian government. Both farms were unable to continue to export flowers, but for different reasons. Meskel Flower ceased production and exports following the arrest of its owner in 2001, 6 while Ethio-Flora shifted production to vegetables only.
7 Despite their early exit, these farms contributed to the initial accumulation of flower industry knowledge in Ethiopia and the feasibility for Golden Rose, a new entrant, relied on the experience of these farms.
The pioneer: Golden Rose
In 1999, Golden Rose Agrofarms Ltd. (Golden Rose, hereafter)-a foreign owned firm-started rose production using steel structure greenhouses, 42 kilometers southwest of Addis Ababa. Although the pioneers (Meskel Flower and EthioFlora) had laid the foundations for the flower industry growing summer flowers, Golden Rose is considered to be the pioneer by many followers due to its introduction of modern technology (e.g., steel structure greenhouses) and still continues to perform well in this sector.
Golden Rose is a subsidiary of RINA Investment, an Indian family business based in the UK. Before entering Ethiopia, the mother company was involved in several business activities (e.g., textiles, property, ostrich farming, and flour mills) in a number of countries including Uganda, Kenya, and Rwanda in Africa. Initially, the company's interest in entering Ethiopia was to purchase privatized state firms. The bid for the state-owned Saint George brewery was not successful and the company had to look for other business opportunities. It hired a consultant which produced a promising feasibility study on rose flower farms. Based on this the company decided to establish a rose farm in Ethiopia. However, neither the mother company nor the managing director of Golden Rose had any experience in flower farming. How did Golden Rose overcome the initial difficulties in acquiring the technology and skilled labor to penetrate the global market? We briefly discuss these issues below, as it may give insight into the type of challenges faced by early entrants.
Golden Rose relied on imported equipment and knowledge to start its flower business, entering a turnkey arrangement with an Israeli consulting company. The consulting firm constructed all the farm facilities (including the greenhouses, irrigation facilities, cold-rooms, etc.), planted the roses, and provided a farm manager for the initial stages. Due to a lack of domestic human resources, Golden Rose recruited two Indian expatriates to support the farm manager put in place by the consultant and began to train up Ethiopian workers. The company (management and workers) faced a major learning curve.
8 On the farm, only the three experts knew about rose growing. At first, the company had almost 50 percent of its production rejected for export based on poor quality and handling. This was mainly due to a lack of skilled labor. The company continued to provide training to its workers and middle managers to improve their skills. However, the company also faced a high turnover of workers after they acquired these new skills. This problem became critical with the entry of new firms in the take-off period. By 2004, the company had lost nearly all the staff it had trained to new firms and was forced continuously to adjust wages in order to retain what skilled labor remained.
Golden Rose began exporting in 2000 via a Dutch auction firm. According to the managing director, the price was initially acceptable. However, after a few months (around July 2000) the auction price declined. Moreover, the firm was subject to a large hidden (service) charge (around 20-25 percent of the price obtained according to the manager), which it did not expect and could not control. Consequently, the company started to receive negative returns. According to the manager, "that was a completely confusing and challenging moment." Since then Golden Rose has searched for direct sales opportunities and abandoned the auction route. It shifted its exports from the Netherlands to Germany. One of the early entrants, Meskel Flower Farm, was also driven out of the Dutch market as a result of competition and lower prices and so had to change its export route to Germany (UNCTAD, 2002).
Golden Rose is not only a pioneer but also one of the most successful and diversified firms in the sector. It continuously expanded up to 2007/08 and showed rapid growth: Its work force grew from 115 to about 900, its production surface area rose from seven hectares to 22.5 hectares, and flower value chains were expanded through the acquisition of trading licenses for import equipment, chemicals, and fertilizers (2003), while also establishing a carton box factory (2004) and propagation facilities (2006) .
What advantage did Golden Rose have over the early entrants (Meskel Flower and Ethio-Flora)? Many factors might explain the relative success of Golden Rose over the other early entrants. Here we focus on two possible reasons: type of product and technology introduced. Ethiopia's comparative advantage lies in the production of medium-to large-sized highland rose varieties (intermediates and T-hybrid). Both the early entrants were, however, located in lowlands at an altitude between 1600 meters and 1800 meters above sea level, which is only suitable for production of small-to medium-sized rose varieties. They started producing summer flowers out-of-doors. Later on, Meskel Flower entered into rose production as a reaction to intense competition and lower prices faced in the Dutch market (UNCTAD, 2002) . But it had two disadvantages. First, the farm was located at low altitude which was only able to produce low-value roses (sweethearts).
9 Second, it produced roses in wooden greenhouses, an outdated technology, which may be related to lack of resources or expertise. In contrast, Golden Rose began producing highland roses, including T-hybrid, intermediates, and sweethearts. It was also the first to introduce the modern steel structured greenhouse.
Early imitators and diffusion of knowledge
Following the entry of Golden Rose, four other rose farms (Summit Agro Industry, Ethio Dreams, SIET Agro PLC, and Eniy Ethio Rose) entered the industry between 2001 and 2003. Three out of the four new entrants were domestically owned. Most of the owners of these farms had migrated from another line of business in an attempt to diversify and had no prior experience in flower farming. According to Golden Rose's manager, unlike the latecomers (i.e., after 2003), these early followers did not try to "poach" skilled workers from the pioneer. Rather, the early followers had very close and cooperative relationships with Golden Rose. They learned from its experience through frequent visits to the farm and discussions with management. The cooperation included sharing of equipment (e.g., trucks), storage facilities (cold storage), and skilled employees.
The early followers imitated some of Golden Rose's production and marketing methods. Like Golden Rose, they mostly produced and exported highland roses including intermediates and T-hybrids. They used expatriates from Kenya, India, and Israel at least during the initial stages. Imported equipment for the construction of physical infrastructure (greenhouses, irrigation systems) came mainly from Israel and the Netherlands. They also relied on international breeders as the main source of new varieties. However, in contrast to Golden Rose's advice, only the foreign-owned firm used direct sales channels, while the three domestically owned firms have always relied on the Dutch auction for their exports.
Take-off and flow of foreign investors
The sequence of entry of firms in the Ethiopian flower industry shows that domestic entrepreneurs played a major role in the initial stages. With the exception of Golden Rose and Ethio Dream, the first movers and early imitators were domestically owned firms. Table 4 A significant number of the foreign firms came from other African countries, including Kenya (e.g., Linsen, Abyssinia, Maranque, Karuturi, and Sher-Ethiopia), Uganda, and Zimbabwe. The better investment climate in Ethiopia compared to these countries may have contributed to the increasing shift of foreign investment to Ethiopia. According to our survey, 33 percent and 23 percent foreign-owned farms rated climate and government-supporting policies respectively as the major reason for investment in the flower industry in Ethiopia.
The large flow of foreign-owned firms helped to "scale-up" the Ethiopian flower industry in terms of both export quantity and company labor force and also diversification of activities and transfer of knowledge. This is exemplified by the fact that all eight summer flower farms and five cuttings farms are entirely foreign owned or are joint ventures with higher foreign shares. The case of Sher-Ethiopia, a subsidiary of Sher-Holland-the biggest flower producer in the world-is an example of the role played by foreign firms in stimulating the sector and particularly the transfer of technology and marketing knowledge (see Box 1).
BOX 1: Sher-Ethiopia
The entry of Sher-Ethiopia in 2005 was a landmark in the Ethiopian flower industry growth. The company had been engaged in the flower farming business in Kenya for over 15 years with production on 300 hectares of farming land (Africa News, 2008) . In 2007, it sold its Kenyan farm and moved to Ethiopia to become the largest investor in the sector. It leased about 500 hectares of land from the government in an area about 170 kilometers from Addis Ababa (known as Zeway) near the highway between Addis Ababa and Nairobi.
Sher-Ethiopia is not only the largest farm but is well known for its unique business scheme. It developed all initial infrastructural investments (including construction of greenhouses, irrigation systems, packing sheds, cold rooms and other facilities, installation of machines, and flower plantations) in the land acquired from government and leased them to other private investors. It provides packets of 10 ha and over, to interested businesses on lease arrangements. Ownership is transferred to the lessee after 105 months (just under nine years). As of 2008, there were nine companies-four local and five foreign-operating under this leasing scheme. In addition to leasing, Sher-Ethiopia supplies seed to nine farms, and handles their exports under the trade mark Afri Flora, and provides training and consultancy (Addis Fortune, 2008 ). This arrangement makes it possible for growers to start immediately on a reasonable scale, without having to take on a major financial and technological risk.
Legitimation: creation of a shared vision through private-public partnership
In the early experimentation stages, entrepreneurs encountered various obstacles. A critical problem for exporters at this stage was lack of reliable and cheap air transportation. For example, in the early years, air cargo space was only available on passenger flights operated by Ethiopian Airlines (EAL) and Lufthansa. Availability of finance was another problem, since the flower industry is capital intensive and start-up investment involved considerable fixed assets. Prior to 2003, private investors in the flower sector were forced to obtain land mainly by leasing it from small farmers. This was a slow process that required consolidation of several small contiguous holdings. Even when the government offered land to investors on a lease basis the bureaucratic procedures were cumbersome. To address these and other problems, the entrepreneurs confronted the government with the potential success and profitability of the flower industry and the opportunity it represented for the country. They organized themselves to form an association, the Ethiopia Horticulture Producers and Exporters Association (EHPEA, the association, hereafter), in September 2002 with five members. The association currently has more than 86 members of which about 81 are flower producers/exporters.
The association has been instrumental in the development of the sector, acting as a "pathfinder." One of its early activities was to lobby government for privileges to be granted to the sector. The association has been highly successful in raising awareness in government about the opportunity represented by the sector and for its smooth operation. For example, the chairman of EHPEA was involved in preparing the first five-year government plan of action for the sector. With government help, the association began to address a wider audience that included buyers, NGOs, and the public. The association has been involved in developing informal networks with donors and organizing various forums, such as international trade fairs. As a result, it has created strong connections with the donor community and secured wide support for the sector. Donors include the UK's Department for International Development, French Development Cooperation, USAID, and the Dutch government. The association organized three international trade fairs in Addis Ababa in 2005 , and in March 2009 . More than 130 companies (mostly foreign companies) related to the floriculture sector (flower growers, breeders, fertilizer and chemicals traders, greenhouse and irrigation system constructors, and refrigeration installation companies) took part in the last two exhibitions. The most recent exhibition was opened with remarks from the Prime Minister, whom exhibitors were invited to meet (Afrik.com, 2009) .
Another important step in the legitimacy process was the adoption in 2007 of a code of conduct for the sector. The association, government, and donors played important roles in this. Adoption of international standards in this code of conduct has helped to promote the image of the Ethiopian flower industry in the international market and address concerns among civil society in Ethiopia about the environmental impact of flower farms.
The success of this new activity, therefore, was enabled by a combination of the collection of separate efforts through entrepreneurial experimentation and also collective action by the various stakeholders-public sector and civil society-toward a shared vision promoted by EHPEA as the pathfinder, to legitimize the trajectory of its development.
Resource mobilization and influencing the direction of search
Prior to 2003, there were few programs specifically targeting the flower industry. The export promotion strategy adopted in 1998 made no mention of the flower industry. Although the flower industry might have benefited from this broad export promotion support scheme, take-off did not occur until industry specific support was provided by the government.
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By the end of 2002, the government realized the opportunity offered by the flower industry to earn sizeable amounts of foreign exchange. Ethiopia was able to enter the top end of the flower market because the quality of its cut roses was on a par with the best in the world (Ecuador and Colombia). Government decided then to actively engage in promoting the sector in terms of resource mobilization and coordination. The Prime Minister's Office (PMO) requested the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MoTI) to propose a five-year action plan for the sector, outlining constraints and possible solutions. Based on the MoTI report, targets were set to put 1,000 hectares under flower production after five years, based on the record of Kenya's output and export earnings. At the end of 2002, the area under glass was less than 30 hectares. To scale up from this base, government came in with multifaceted support starting in 2003, focusing particularly on access to land, access to long-term credit, infrastructure, and air transport coordination.
After the government decision to support the sector, land held by government was made available for flower farms near to the airport in Addis Ababa, at very cheap prices of under US$20 per annum per hectare. Table 5 reports the sources of land and average duration of tenure. The majority of those surveyed (83 percent) indicated that their land was government leased. Land lease payments were fixed over an extended period of, on average, 21.5 years. This helped to reduce the financial burden for investors and made entry easier. The average tenure period is 27.5 years and the maximum 90 years. Provision of this land at low prices and with longer tenure periods would not have been possible without the release of government land.
The government also provided long-term credit on very generous terms through the Development Bank of Ethiopia (DBE). Investors can borrow up to 70:30 debt-equity ratio with no collateral requirement. Interest rates are low and do not vary much. According to our survey, 75 percent of farms have a bank term loan and 45 percent of them reported borrowing from DBE for their initial investment. The majority of farms (62.5 percent) indicated that firm equity was the only collateral required for a bank loan (Table 5 ). This scheme is widely applied to preferred export sectors including textiles, leather, and horticulture. Compared to other major horticultural exporter countries in Africa, government support in Ethiopia is clearly very favorable. For example, the fixed interest rate (around 7.5 percent) is very low compared to many other African countries' interest rates, which are generally around 15 percent. The real interest rate that Ethiopian exporters have been required to pay since 2005 is zero or negative when calculated against the growing rate of inflation in Ethiopia. This translates into a pure resource transfer (subsidy) to exporters. The government has also played an important role in resolving the air transport problem. It initiated discussions and cooperation between exporters and Ethiopian Airlines with the result that the majority (87 percent) of flower farm enterprises use this airline (Table 5) . EAL supports the flower industry by leasing cargo planes. In 2008, the airline also relocated its cargo handling activities from Amsterdam to Brussels and Liege Airports in Belgium, running six to 10 daytime flights weekly, to transport flowers to the major flower auctions (Liege Airport, 2008) . Other foreign carriers, including KLM, Lufthansa, Etihad, and Emirates, have begun to carry flowers from Ethiopia, and exporters are working to open up the airfreight market. They claim that unlike the situation in Kenya, the airfreight market in Ethiopia is overregulated based on the authorities' concerns regarding foreign exchange.
As well as mobilizing resources, the government is involved in advocacy to attract domestic and foreign investors. Its strong commitment is demonstrated by the involvement of top officials including the Prime Minister through his position as the chair of the National Export Promotion Committee and frequent interaction with sector entrepreneurs directly and via their association. 
Knowledge transfer and diffusion: interactive learning process
The main source of technology for the development of the flower industry is foreign. Technology transfer occurs mainly through private acquisitions, i.e., equipment purchase and plants (new varieties) licensed from international companies. In the initial period, there was an acute shortage of domestic manpower skilled in flower production and marketing. Hence, most early-entrant farms hired expatriates, particularly from neighboring Kenya.
The turnover of skilled workers became one of the main channels for the diffusion of knowledge. Poaching of experienced workers increased with the accumulation of some knowledge among the early movers and also increased new entry. As already discussed, the pioneer Golden Rose suffered from very high turnover of trained employees, particularly following the influx of new firms in 2004, and was forced continuously to adjust its wages in a bid to retain its skilled labor. As the sector expanded, the pool of domestic expertise has increased and the market for skilled labor has stabilized. There is increasing availability of experienced people on the flower farms. As a result, the latecomers had a higher chance of recruiting managers and supervisors who had experience in other Ethiopian flower farms. According to our survey, for example, among the 15 new entrants in 2006, 11 reported recruiting managers and supervisors for their initial production from other domestic flower farms. And in 2007, among the 12 new entrants, eight reported recruiting Ethiopian managers or supervisors for their start-up phase. In contrast, of the eight farms that started production before 2005, only one reported using Ethiopian managers or supervisors recruited from other flower farms in Ethiopia.
Another important mechanism of knowledge diffusion and learning is inhouse and external training. According to our survey, the majority of farms provide (in-house and external) short-term training for production workers and agro-specialists. The association plays a significant role in organizing external training courses for workers and managers from member farms and includes training for the certification of a sector code of conduct.
As the sector expands, the supply of industry specialists becomes more critical. With the support of the Dutch government, the Ethiopian government has started to consolidate higher education in horticulture. One of the state universities, Jimma University, has begun to offer diplomas (BSc and MSc) in floriculture. Efforts are also underway to establish a Horticulture Practical Training Center (HPTC) within the Ethiopian-Netherlands Partnership on Horticulture. So far there are no links with the national agricultural research organization (EARO) on the development of new varieties. Thus, the sector may have to continue to rely on international breeders for sourcing suitable rose varieties and conducting adaptive trials in the medium and even longer term.
Market formation
There are markets for flowers across the developed world, hence, in the early stages, the problem was mainly to link to the existing markets. For Ethiopia-and for all of Africa-the major flower export destination is the EU. Cut flowers are sold via auction markets (mainly Dutch auctions) or directly to supermarkets and other retailers. Relative ease of access to the auction market means new entrants tend to begin by using this channel. The main barrier to the European market in the early stage was the cost and the poor availability of air cargo space. Government efforts to coordinate transport with the EAL largely resolved this problem.
Access to the EU market has become more difficult due to new rules and standards. To respond to these, in 2006, the Ethiopian Flower Association developed its own code of conduct which was implemented in 2007. During its development, 20 farms joined a pilot training program and 10 farms received certification in 2009. Subsequently, the training program was scaled up and the majority of the farms participated in the training and about 50 farms were certified with the code of conduct in the period from September 2007 to March 2010.
Over time the sector has become more diversified in terms of market channels and destinations. In 2007, 41 farms reported involvement in direct sales. The number of destinations has increased from two to three countries (all in Europe) in the early 2000s, to some 56 worldwide in 2008.
11 There are 14 destination countries with an export value of US$100,000 and over. The EU is still the major destination, accounting for around 94.5 percent of total export value, with the Netherlands (88 percent) in the lead.
The association continues to play an important role in expanding the market. The association members visited or received visitors from potential buyer countries in Europe, the Middle East, and Japan. Currently, they are keen to expand business links with the Dubai Flower Centre (DFC) because of its geographical and logistical advantages, which would boost their supplies to the Middle East and the Far East.
Development of positive externalities
The sources of positive externalities in the evolution of new activities are widespread. For example, the entry of pioneers into the business was crucial for smoothing the way for followers. This was discussed in section 4.1 in relation to the entry process. Stabilization of the market for skilled labor is another positive externality that has come with sector expansion. This was also discussed in section 4.4 under knowledge transfer and diffusion. Here, we concentrate on the positive externalities arising from the diversification of activities.
With the expansion of the sector, complementary activities, such as propagation of planting materials, packaging, fertilizers and chemicals supplies, and forwarding companies, started to emerge. By early 2008, there were six cuttings companies, all European in origin, producing pot plants and cut flower cuttings for export. The cuttings farms also propagate new varieties for the domestic market. A number of rose farms have begun to propagate for their own use and for the domestic market. Thus, the source of plant materials is slowly shifting from imports to local supply. There is an increasing trend for imported fertilizers and chemicals to be substituted by local production, and the majority of farms (96 percent) use locally produced packaging materials.
Summary and concluding remarks
This paper has examined the evolution of the Ethiopian flower industry as an example of successful non-traditional natural-resource based export activities in developing countries. The trigger factors for the emergence of the flower industry in Ethiopia included the combination of several factors. Natural endowment and generous government incentives for all export activities created favorable conditions compared to neighboring flower exporting countries. However, without entrepreneurial experimentation, the industry could not have established itself. The flower industry was not among the government's initial priority list of export activities. Thus, experimentation by private entrepreneurs was the first critical step in the discovery of the sector. The role of these early entrants was important for reducing uncertainties for fellow investors (positive externality) and for making the government aware of this alternative policy option.
One characteristic of the early stage in a new activity is the prevalence of huge uncertainty in technology, markets and infrastructure. Legitimation and resource mobilization were badly needed by the early entrants. Following advocacy activity by the entrepreneurs, the government began to provide support and launched a strategy to guide the direction of search. It established a five-year target and identified three key areas of intervention: provision of long-term credit; provision of land; and coordination of air transport. The government intervention in terms of improving legitimation, resource mobilization and guidance was the crucial next step. It helped to reduce the uncertainties surrounding the early entrants and created the conditions for the industry to expand.
Market formation was relatively less challenging in the early phase, when the main task was to link into the existing international market and search for a market niche, mainly through auctions in the Netherlands. The later period required some market formation for the producers to stay in the market for a sustained period. To improve the reputation of the industry in the world market, the association focused strongly on quality control and developed an industry code of conduct. The association also contributed by diversifying and expanding market destinations. In this regard, the private sector took the lead role through the association while government played a supportive role.
The flower sector had to rely on international purchase to acquire the necessary technology and expertise for production and marketing, particularly in the initial stages. Foreign direct investment played an important role in knowledge transfer and diffusion. Training and turnover of skilled workers were the main channels of the knowledge diffusion in the sector. In the later stages, the association and government supported human capacity building with the former organizing short courses and the latter consolidating higher education in horticulture.
This study shows that the presence of a pathfinder institution, in this case the association, to consistently pursue development of the sector and coordinate activities is crucial. The association has played a critical role in the success of the Ethiopian flower industry. Its activities cover a wide spectrum, including lobbying government, standards setting, collective market search, developing the capacity of members, and the promoting and legitimation of the sector.
It shows also that collaboration between government and the private sector is required for sector building. The private entrepreneurs discovered that flowers could be produced and exported profitably. They formed an association in an effort to build a strong advocacy coalition and were able to convince the government about the opportunity offered by the sector. The government recognized the opportunity and potential and added cut flower production to its priority list. It began by inviting the association representatives to participate in the preparation of the first five-year action plan for the sector, outlining constraints and possible solutions. The association and government achieved consensus and a shared vision of sector development, which further improved legitimacy.
As we describe the process of discovery applying a functional approach of innovation systems, we are able to identify that relative importance of how the functions differ by the stage of development of the sector. For example, legitimation in the initial stages was mainly targeted at acquiring government support, but in the later stages focused on the wider audience. Market formation was not a huge challenge in the early stages but become crucial in the later stages. Correspondingly, the role of government changed through the different phases of sector development. In the early stages government played a developmental role by providing inputs and sharing costs (e.g., finance, land, and transport coordination). In the later stages, other forms of engagement such as an increasing regulatory role, capacity building, formalization of interactions, and strengthening of institutions is required. This suggests that successful policies must be context specific and may differ by country and sector/activity and also by stage of development of the activity. This reinforces the importance of a dynamic policy and ability of policy makers to react quickly to the needs of the private sector.
Structural transformation is crucial for developing countries. Due to the globalization of the economy, the export sector can create a space for learning through interaction with various external stakeholders; however, the process of learning is not automatic. The timing is crucial as is the identification of solutions. Formulating and identifying the appropriate policy ex-ante is difficult. The example of the Ethiopian flower industry demonstrates that the functions of the IS framework can support this policy formulation process by providing guidelines to enable the search for the right solutions by identifying the actors, functions, and impediments in the wider, systemic context.
